Announcement effects of health policy reformsb : evidence from the abolition of Austria’s baby bonus by Brunner, Beatrice & Kuhn, Andreas
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2014
Announcement effects of health policy reformsb : evidence from the
abolition of Austria’s baby bonus
Brunner, Beatrice; Kuhn, Andreas
Abstract: We analyze the short-run fertility and health effects resulting from the early announcement
of the abolition of the Austrian baby bonus in January 1997. The abolition of the benefit was publicly
announced about 10months in advance, creating the opportunity for prospective parents to (re-)schedule
conceptions accordingly. We find robust evidence that, within the month before the abolition, about
8% more children were born as a result of (re-)scheduling conceptions. At the same time, there is no
evidence that mothers deliberately manipulated the date of birth through medical intervention. We also
find a substantial and significant increase in the fraction of birth complications, but no evidence for any
resulting adverse effects on newborns’ health.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10198-013-0481-4
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-171964
Journal Article
Published Version
Originally published at:
Brunner, Beatrice; Kuhn, Andreas (2014). Announcement effects of health policy reformsb : evidence
from the abolition of Austria’s baby bonus. European Journal of Health Economics, 15(4):373-388.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10198-013-0481-4
ORIGINAL PAPER
Announcement effects of health policy reforms: evidence
from the abolition of Austria’s baby bonus
Beatrice Brunner • Andreas Kuhn
Received: 23 February 2012 / Accepted: 3 April 2013 / Published online: 4 May 2013
 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013
Abstract We analyze the short-run fertility and health
effects resulting from the early announcement of the abo-
lition of the Austrian baby bonus in January 1997. The
abolition of the benefit was publicly announced about
10 months in advance, creating the opportunity for pro-
spective parents to (re-)schedule conceptions accordingly.
We find robust evidence that, within the month before the
abolition, about 8 % more children were born as a result of
(re-)scheduling conceptions. At the same time, there is no
evidence that mothers deliberately manipulated the date of
birth through medical intervention. We also find a sub-
stantial and significant increase in the fraction of birth
complications, but no evidence for any resulting adverse
effects on newborns’ health.
Keywords Baby bonus  Scheduling of conceptions 
Timing of births  Policy announcement  Announcement
effect  Birth complications  Medical intervention
JEL Classification H31  J13
Introduction
Forward looking behavior of individuals has potentially
important implications for the implementation, as well as for
the evaluation, of health policy reforms (and beyond). Indeed,
if individuals are forward looking and if policy reforms are
publicly announced in advance, individuals are likely to adapt
their behavior even before the effective implementation of any
given policy reform. As Malani and Reif [16, p. 2] put it,
‘‘anticipation is a reasonable diagnosis if individuals are for-
ward looking, have access to information on future treatment,
and there is a benefit to acting before the treatment is adop-
ted’’. Clearly, policy makers need to be aware of potential
announcement effects resulting from anticipatory behavior
whenever they are planning to implement major health policy
reforms and to announce them beforehand. It is also evident
that anticipatory behavior should be factored in when evalu-
ating specific health policy reforms. In fact, ignoring
announcement effects may lead to misleading conclusions
regarding the impact of the policy reform under study [5, 16].
Moreover, we may be especially concerned about potential
negative health effects if individuals anticipate even small
changes in financial incentives, but are unable to foresee all
potential health effects resulting from specific behavioral
changes. We believe that such a situation is especially com-
mon in health policy contexts where it is very difficult, even
for experts, to plausibly assess all potential health effects
resulting from any given change in health-related behavior.
Some of the most compelling empirical evidence on
announcement effects of health policy reforms available
comes from the recent experience of introducing baby
bonuses in Australia and Germany, respectively. Indeed, a
couple of recent empirical studies has convincingly shown
that the introduction of such policy measures is usually
associated with considerable behavioral responses in the
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short-run, potentially resulting in negative health effects for
the mother and/or her newborn child.1 In the case of
Australia, the government publicly announced on May 11,
2004, that it would pay 3,000 $ (about 2,190 €) to each
family of a newborn child born on or after July 1, 2004.2
The introduction of the bonus was thus announced in
advance of the effective policy change, creating an incen-
tive to delay births. In their empirical evaluation of the
policy change, Gans and Leigh [12] find that 6 % of the
births (more than 1,000 births) expected to happen in the
28 days preceding the actual policy change were moved to
July 1st 2004 or later to become eligible for the baby
bonus.3 They find that most of the effect is due to a cor-
responding timing of induction and cesarean section pro-
cedures. Consequently, they also find that children who
were moved into the eligibility period were more likely to
be of high birth weight.4 Tamm [26] analyzes a similar
reform in the system of family benefits in Germany, the
introduction of parental leave benefits (‘‘Elterngeld’’) as of
January 1, 2007.5 As in Australia, the announcement hap-
pened only a few weeks in advance, meaning that the
policy change could only affect the timing, but not the
number of births. Similarly to Gans and Leigh [12], Tamm
finds that a substantial number of births were delayed and
moved into the eligibility period for the new benefit sys-
tem. Specifically, he concludes that almost 8 % of births
(around 1,000 births) that could have been expected in the
last week of December were shifted to the first week of
January 2007. He also finds a slight increase in birth weight
among the births most likely to have been shifted (i.e.,
January vs. December births).
In this paper we study the fertility effects, as well as
the potential health consequences for both mother and
newborn child, following the announcement of the aboli-
tion of the Austrian baby bonus as of January 1, 1997. The
Austrian baby bonus amounted to a maximum of 1,090 €
per child in 1996, the year before the abolition, and was
paid conditional on medical examinations of both mother
and newborn child. The unique feature of this policy
change is that the elimination of the benefit was
announced about 10 months prior to enactment, creating
the potential for an announcement effect because pro-
spective parents had both an incentive and the opportunity
to move their baby plans forward. Although the response
window in order to qualify for the birth benefit before its
abolition was only limited to 3 weeks, the early
announcement could have increased the number of babies
born in the month prior to the policy change. On top of
this, pregnant women with a due date close to the date of
the policy change might have manipulated the exact day
of birth by means of a medical intervention (i.e., cesarean
section). In the second part of the analysis, we will
explore whether the early announcement of the policy
reform had any negative health effects for mothers and/or
her newborn children.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
section ‘‘The Austrian baby bonus’’ we provide some
background information on the baby bonus in Austria. This
is followed by a short discussion of the data source and
some descriptives in section ‘‘Data and descriptives’’. We
present our estimates of the fertility response following the
announcement of the abolition of the baby bonus in section
‘‘The fertility response’’. Section ‘‘Taking risks for the
bonus?’’ examines whether mothers (un)consciously take
increased health risks for themselves and/or their babies
when rescheduling the timing of conception or birth. Sec-
tion ‘‘Conclusions’’ concludes.
The Austrian baby bonus
Institutional background
The Austrian baby bonus (‘‘Geburtenbeihilfe’’) was first
introduced on January 1, 1968, as an untaxed single pay-
ment per live birth. In 1975 the payment of the bonus was
made conditional on medical examinations both during
pregnancy and after childbirth, and the payment of the
bonus was consequently partitioned. After the last expan-
sion of the birth benefit in January 1987, the maximum
benefit amounted to 1,090 € per child and was paid in five
1 Substantial effects on birth timing are also found by Dickert-Conlin
and Chandra [10] and Chen [7] who study the effects of tax incentives
on the timing of births in the US and France, respectively. Other
studies have found that taxes distort other types of individual behavior
such as marriages [1] or even deaths [14].
2 More precisely, the baby bonus replaced another policy previously
in force. In the previous system, the bonus was dependent on the
income of the primary caregiver in the year the child was born and
was in the form of a refundable tax offset. Most, though not all,
households had an incentive to move births to July 1, 2004, or later.
See Gans and Leigh [12] for details.
3 Drago et al. [11] also analyze the introduction of the birth benefit in
Australia, but use a different data source. They find that the birth
benefit had both a positive effect on women’s fertility intentions and
one of modest size on the effective birthrate. Positive fertility effects
from the Australian policy change are also reported in Lain et al. [15].
4 This in turn may imply long-run effects of short-run behavioral
responses, since birth weight is suspected to be causally related with
later labor-market outcomes (e.g. Black et al. [3]).
5 As in the case of Australia, the German policy changed incentives
differently for households with different characteristics. Generally,
households with women working before giving birth, those planning
to work shortly following birth, or those with high income received
higher benefits after the reform and thus had an incentive to delay
their births. See Tamm [26] for details. Neugart and Ohlsson [18]
provide an alternative evaluation of the German parental benefit
reform (with similar conclusions).
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consecutive rates. The first rate of the bonus was paid
immediately after birth (145.3 €), the second rate 1 week
after birth (218 €), and the remaining three rates were paid
after the child’s first (363.4 €), second (218 €), and fourth
(145.3 €) birthday.
Policy makers wanted to sustain the incentive for
mothers to continue with medical examinations for them-
selves and their newborn children even after the abolition
of the baby bonus; they thus introduced an alternative
incentive, the so-called ‘‘Mutter-Kind-Pass’’, which is still
in place today. It consists of a single bonus of 145 € per
birth; the payment is conditional on both mother and child
undergoing specific medical examinations, and it is paid on
the child’s first birthday. Furthermore, eligibility to the new
bonus is confined to mothers who are the child’s primary
caregiver and to households whose income does not exceed
a given threshold in the year of birth.6 Thus, depending on
household income, the abolition of the birth benefit meant a
cut in cash benefits amounting to either 945 € or 1,090 €
(equivalent to a cut in benefits of 87 or 100 %, respec-
tively). For a full-time employee (not household) with
median labor earnings in 1996 equal to 20,991 €, the full
amount of the baby bonus was worth approximately 4.5 %
of his or her annual earnings (equivalent to about 2.3
weeks’ income).
Compared to other family benefits, the baby bonus was
rather modest in size. Aside from the birth benefit, three
basic other types of family benefits existed (and still exist
today). The most important (i.e., substantial) benefit is the
family benefit (‘‘Familienbeihilfe’’), which is paid until the
child’s 18th birthday at the minimum. In 1997 it amounted
to 95–134 € per month, depending on the child’s age.
Parental leave benefits were paid over a period of 1.5 years
at that time, and amounted to 340 € per month. However,
until another major reform in 2002, these benefits were tied
to the mother’s employment before giving birth. Finally,
there is a monthly tax allowance for children who live in
the same household as the parent filing the tax report. The
tax allowance amounted to 25–51 € per month in 1997,
depending on the child’s parity. Taken together, the baby
bonus accounted for roughly 9 % of all benefits (excluding
tax allowances) accruing within the first 4 years of a
child’s life.7
The abolition of the baby bonus
The structural deficit of the federal budget was the ultimate
reason for the abolition of the baby bonus. Generous social
benefits combined with a deterioration of the labor market
caused the ratio of social expenditure to GDP to skyrocket
in the early 1990s. In spite of a temporary strengthening of
the economy in 1994, social expenditures still rose,
resulting in an overall increase of 36.5 % between 1991
and 1996 [2]. To decelerate rising social spending, the
governing coalition between the conservatives and the
social democrats finally passed an encompassing austerity
package (‘‘Strukturanpassungsgesetz’’) on July 1, 1996.
Savings in family policy should be achieved by reducing
maternity leave duration by half a year (from 24 to
18 months) and by abolishing the baby bonus. In terms of
our identification strategy, it is important to stress that,
except for the birth benefit, all reforms decided on within
the framework of the austerity program came into effect on
July 1, 1996—half a year before the abolition of the baby
bonus.
Our review of newspapers suggests that the abolition
must have been known by February 2, 1996, when the
coalition between the conservatives and the social demo-
crats first announced their agreement on the austerity
package. There was extensive press coverage, but there
was also confusion about the exact date of abolition, and
the media initially discussed July 1, 1996 as the effective
date of elimination. By the first week of March, however,
shortly before the coalition’s agreement on the structural
adjustment law was signed (March 11, 1996), it must have
been evident that the birth benefit would be canceled for all
children born on January 1, 1997 or later.
The window of opportunity
From what we have said above, it follows that there was a
time gap of nearly 10 months between the definitive
announcement and the effective date of the policy change.
Because the abolition of the baby bonus implies an increase
in the price of a further child, prospective parents had a
financial incentive to move their baby plans forward. From
the time of the announcement of the elimination of the
birth benefit, the time window during which a baby would
have to be conceived in order to still get the birth benefit
was very short, however.
In fact, we can be quite precise regarding the length of
this time window because the duration of gestation is
recorded in the birth statistics (more details are given in
section ‘‘Data and descriptives’’ below). In the time period
considered (i.e., the period from July 1990 until December
2006), the length of a pregnancy shows an approximately
normal distribution, with a mean duration of 276 days and
6 Specifically, the maximum household income in order to qualify for
the ‘‘Mutter-Kind-Pass’’ bonus is defined as 11  HBGr, with HBGr
(‘‘Ho¨chstbemessungsgrundlage’’) denoting the upper income thresh-
old above which the maximum pension benefit accrues. The threshold
varies over time and amounted to 2,965 € in 1997. Thus, annual
household income had to be lower than 32,616 € in 1997 to qualify
for the ‘‘Mutter-Kind-Pass’’.
7 Neglecting tax deductibles, [1,090 €/(41294.5 € ? 1.512338.6
€ ? 1,090 €)] ^ 0.093.
Announcement effects of health policy reforms 375
123
a standard deviation of about 14 days. The abolition of the
bonus was definitely announced on March 7, 1996. After a
mean pregnancy duration of 276 days, birth would take
place on December 8 at the earliest. The potential response
time for women with average pregnancy duration therefore
lasts 23 days (i.e., December 31–December 8)—a little bit
more than 3 weeks. The corresponding 90 % confidence
interval ranges from 266 to 287 days, implying that
approximately 90 % (10 %) of all conceptions from March
19 (April 9) can be expected to be born before January 1,
1997.8 These simple calculations make it clear that the
window of opportunity was short, and that prospective
parents thus had to respond quite immediately if they
wanted to still be eligible for the bonus after the abolition
had been made public.
Data and descriptives
Data source
Our empirical analysis relies on individual birth records
from the Austrian birth statistics (‘‘Geburtenstatistik’’),
covering all births from 1971 until 2006. In addition to
information on year and month of birth, the data also
contains some information on parental characteristics (such
as age, education, marital status, labor market status, reli-
gion, and nationality) and, beginning in 1984, some health
measures for the newborn child (such as weight, length,
and Apgar score).9 Moreover, information regarding the
implemented birth procedure is recorded in the data from
1995 onwards.
Sample period(s)
Our baseline sample period basically covers the period
from July 1990 until December 2006. We start the sample
period in July 1990 because another major family policy
reform took effect on that specific date (the reform basi-
cally involved a massive extension of the duration of
parental leave benefits).10 The sample period is consider-
ably shorter, however, when we focus either on newborn’s
health or on birth procedure due to data availability.
As we will show below, however, the exact length of the
sample period does not appear to have any substantial
impact on our results. In fact, our estimates of the policy
impact turn out to be robust across a wide range of alter-
native sample periods (as will be shown in section
‘‘Robustness’’ below).
The monthly birth count, 1990–2006
Figure 1 shows both the observed and the de-trended
absolute number of monthly births from January 1990 to
December 2006.
Panel (a) shows the absolute number of monthly births,
with dots (triangles) indicating the number of births in
December (January) in any given year. Two specific fea-
tures stand out clearly. First, there is a strong non-linear
trend in the number of births, with a pronounced hump
shape in the 1990s (presumably reflecting the large immi-
grant influx from the Balkan countries at that time) and a
flattening afterwards. The number of monthly births
increased from about 7,500 births per month in the early
1990s to a high of somewhat more than 8,000 births per
month in the mid 1990s. The number of births began to
decrease again at the end of the 1990s, when the number of
births seems to have stabilized at about 6,500 births per
month. The second outstanding feature is the existence of a
pronounced cyclical pattern within any given year. Within
each year, many more children are born in the middle
rather than at the end of the year.11 Even more striking is
the fact that the number of children born in December over
the whole period considered never exceeds the number of
8 Note that it is possible that some couples already tried to conceive
after February 2, 1996, even though there was confusion about the
exact date of abolition until March 7, 1996. It is, therefore, still
possible to find an increase in births before December 1996. See also
footnote 12.
9 The Apgar score is used to assess the health of a newborn
immediately after birth. In our data, the Apgar score one, five, and 10
min after birth is recorded. The Apgar score assesses five different
categories (heart rate, breathing, muscle tone, reflex response, and
skin color) with a score between zero and two each, where the scores
are simply added up. Low values on the score are indicative of poor
health. In the regression reported in section ‘‘Newborns’ health’’
below, we use the average of a child’s score 1, 5, and 10 min after
birth.
10 It is worth mentioning that our basic sample period covers, besides
the austerity package and the abolition of the baby bonus, two other
major policy changes in family law that were made public in August
2001. First, parental leave duration was extended from 18 to
30 months for all mothers who were on maternity leave during
August 2001, gave birth after July 2000, and earned no more than
14,600 € per year. A second reform was enacted in January 2002 and
decoupled eligibility to maternity leave benefits from any prior work
requirement, thus extending eligibility to self-employed women and
mothers not in the labor force. We control for these policy changes by
including appropriately defined indicator variables in the regressions
that are based on sample periods covering these policies.
11 There are basically two explanations for the seasonal pattern in
birth timing. First, there are seasonal fluctuations in marriages which
may lead to fluctuations in births. In fact, marriage seasonality in
Austria matches the seasonal pattern in births if newlywed couples
immediately stop using contraceptives with the intent of conceiving.
A second explanation are parental preferences regarding the month of
birth [25]. See also Buckles and Hungerman [6] for a detailed
discussion of both causes and consequences of seasonality in births.
376 B. Brunner, A. Kuhn
123
births in January—except in December 1996, the month
just before the birth benefit was effectively abolished.
We remove the time trend from the data in panel
(b) and, thus, make the monthly cyclicality in births more
evident. In each year, the number of births is lowest at the
end of the year and highest in the middle. The year 1996
clearly stands out regarding the number of children, espe-
cially those born in December. In fact, the de-trended
number of births in December 1996 (463) corresponds to
the 95th percentile of the distribution of de-trended number
of births over the entire period and to the 1st percentile of
the distribution of the de-trended number of births in
December.
Maternal characteristics
Table 1 shows maternal characteristics for five different
subsamples (i.e., sample periods), including the subsample
of mothers giving birth in December 1996 which appears in
the last column (the asterisks denote significant differences
between the last and the first, second, third, or fourth col-
umn, respectively).
Three features are noteworthy. First, most maternal
characteristics are trending over time. For example, there
are substantial shifts in mothers’ age at birth (i.e., mothers
become older over time). Second, there are cyclical pat-
terns within any given year, consistent with the evidence
on seasonal patterns in births presented by Buckles and
Hungerman [6]. That is, the table shows that mothers
giving birth in December are different from mothers giving
birth in any month on most dimensions considered. For
example, mothers giving birth in December appear to be
slightly younger than the average mother. Third, mothers
giving birth in December 1996 differ from mothers giving
birth in December (in years other than 1996). However,
due to the trending nature of the variables, it is difficult to
tell whether this difference is due to compositional changes
related to the abolition of the baby bonus.
The fertility response
Estimating the fertility response
A couple of issues have to be considered when estimating
the fertility response following the announcement of the
abolition of the baby bonus. First, note that we have to rely
on the longitudinal patterns in the number of births to
estimate the policy impact on the birth count. Because
there is no control group available, the outcome in the
absence of the policy change needs to be predicted using
regularities in the data before and/or after the policy
change. Another issue is that there may be a permanent
effect from the abolition of the baby bonus on fertility
behavior. This implies that we should be cautious when
using, or potentially try to do without, data from after the
baby bonus has been abolished (i.e., data after December
1996). Second, Fig. 1 suggests that we should try to model
a flexible time trend in the number of births when using a
longer sample period. However, it turns out that fitting a
flexible time trend becomes somewhat difficult when only
using data from before the policy change because obser-
vations at the boundary of the sample period have a strong
impact on the estimated time trend in case of a nonlinear
trend (and thus on the estimate of the fertility response as
well). We use two distinct empirical strategies to cope with
these issues in the following.
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Fig. 1 Actual and de-trended number of monthly births a observed
absolute number of monthly births, b de-trended number of monthly
births. Notes: a shows the observed number of monthly births. The
dotted line shows the actual number of monthly births, the solid line
displays the 3-month moving average (we average over the current
observation as well as three lags and leads). b shows the de-trended
number of monthly births (de-trending is done using a Hodrick–
Prescott filter with default smoothing parameter). The solid line
represents the 2-month moving average. The dots (triangles) indicate
the actual or de-trended number of births in December (January) of
each year
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Table 1 Maternal characteristics
Sample period: 1992.11-1996.10 1994.11-1996.10 Dec 1992-1995 Dec 1994-1995 Dec 1996
Age
Aged below 20 0.046**
(0.208)
0.041
(0.198)
0.048***
(0.213)
0.042
(0.201)
0.040
(0.196)
Aged between 20 and 24 0.253***
(0.434)
0.236***
(0.424)
0.256***
(0.436)
0.244***
(0.429)
0.211
(0.408)
Aged between 25 and 29 0.382
(0.485)
0.384
(0.486)
0.381
(0.485)
0.385
(0.486)
0.381
(0.485)
Aged between 30 and 34 0.232***
(0.422)
0.247***
(0.431)
0.227***
(0.418)
0.236***
(0.424)
0.266
(0.441)
Aged between 35 and 39 0.075***
(0.262)
0.079**
(0.27)
0.076***
(0.264)
0.079**
(0.269)
0.087
(0.281)
Older than 40 0.012*
(0.109)
0.013
(0.113)
0.012
(0.108)
0.013
(0.114)
0.014
(0.118)
Child order
First child 0.447
(0.497)
0.445
(0.496)
0.451
(0.497)
0.446
(0.497)
0.450
(0.497)
Second child 0.362
(0.48)
0.364
(0.481)
0.355
(0.478)
0.360
(0.48)
0.359
(0.479)
Third or higher order child 0.191
(0.392)
0.191
(0.392)
0.194
(0.395)
0.193
(0.394)
0.192
(0.393)
Parity 1.829
(0.978)
1.830
(0.975)
1.833
(0.994)
1.837
(0.993)
1.825
(0.969)
Marital status
Single 0.238***
(0.425)
0.243**
(0.428)
0.236***
(0.424)
0.247
(0.431)
0.253
(0.434)
Married 0.726***
(0.445)
0.720***
(0.449)
0.727***
(0.445)
0.714*
(0.451)
0.703
(0.457)
Divorced, widowed 0.036***
(0.187)
0.038***
(0.19)
0.037***
(0.188)
0.039**
(0.192)
0.045
(0.206)
Citizenship
Native 0.813
(0.389)
0.809
(0.393)
0.814
(0.388)
0.811
(0.391)
0.809
(0.393)
Formal education
Mandatory school 0.243***
(0.428)
0.229***
(0.42)
0.250***
(0.433)
0.243***
(0.429)
0.205
(0.403)
Vocational school for apprentices 0.378
(0.485)
0.377
(0.484)
0.379
(0.485)
0.374
(0.483)
0.373
(0.483)
Intermediated technical or 0.174 0.173 0.174 0.171 0.179
vocational school (0.379) (0.378) (0.379) (0.376) (0.383)
Higher technical or 0.112* 0.117 0.108*** 0.114 0.119
vocational school (0.315) (0.321) (0.31) (0.317) (0.323)
University or university college 0.076**
(0.264)
0.080
(0.271)
0.072***
(0.258)
0.075**
(0.263)
0.083
(0.275)
Unknown education 0.017***
(0.128)
0.024***
(0.154)
0.016***
(0.124)
0.023***
(0.149)
0.041
(0.198)
Employment status
Employed before birth 0.738***
(0.439)
0.737***
(0.44)
0.739***
(0.439)
0.735**
(0.441)
0.719
(0.449)
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Our first empirical strategy only uses data from before the
policy change until (and including) October 1996, but
refrains from fitting a flexible time trend.12 At the same time,
we want to focus on a time period within an approximately
linear time trend in the number of births. A simple visual
inspection of the observed number of births, as in Fig. 1,
suggests that there is a linear time trend in the monthly
number of births from about 1992 onwards. We thus regress
the absolute (or, alternatively, the log) number of births on a
linear time trend and a series of dummies for calendar month,
denoted by cm, on a sample period of varying length
bt ¼ a þ bt þ cm þ et; ð1Þ
with t 2 fT; T þ 1; . . .; 1996:9; 1996:10g. We let T be
equal to either 1992.11, 1993.11, or 1994.11. Thus the
sample period consists of either 48, 36, or 24 months (in
section ‘‘Robustness’’, we show that our results are also
robust to alternative sample periods).
In the second strategy, we use observations from both
before and after the policy change, implicitly assuming that
only those parents move birth forward who originally
wanted to give birth in the time period that we omit from
the sample period. Using observations from after the policy
change as well makes it possible to use a much more
flexible form for the time trend in the number of births
bt ¼ a þ bjðtÞ þ cm þ d1ðt 1997:1Þ þ et; ð2Þ
with t 2 f1990:7; 1990:8; . . .; 1996:9; 1996:10; T ; T þ
1; . . .; 2006:11; 2006:12g. That is, t runs from July 1990 to
December 2006 in this case, but we leave out a period of
varying length in the middle of the sample period, running
from 1996.11 to T. We let T equal either 1997.1, 1998.1 or
1999.1, and, thus, the period that is left out from the
analysis correspond to either 2, 14, or 26 months. In this
second scenario we allow for a flexible time trend in the
number of births, using a fourth-order polynomial in t,
denoted by j(t). We also allow for the possibility of any
permanent effect of the abolition of the bonus on the
number of births by including a dummy variable that takes
on the value of 1 if t is equal to or [1997.1. Thus d will
capture any permanent fertility of the abolition of the bonus
(as well as differences in the number of births between the
two time periods for any other reasons).13
For either strategy, we then use the estimates from the
above regressions in a second step to make an out-of-
sample prediction of the number of babies that would have
been born in December 1996 in the absence of the policy
change, denoted by bb1996:12. The difference between the
observed and the predicted number of births in December
1996,
b1996:12  bb1996:12; ð3Þ
is our estimate of the impact of the (public announce-
ment of the) abolition of the baby bonus on the number
of children born in December 1996, relative to the
number of children we would have expected in the
absence of the policy change (or, alternatively, in the
case that the abolition were not publicly announced in
advance).
Table 2 shows results for both the absolute number of
births and the log number of births and for the two different
strategies outlined above.14 Panel A shows the resulting
estimates when using data from before the policy only, but
for three different sample periods, combined with a simple
linear time trend in each case. Depending on the length of
the sample period, estimates of the additional number of
births in December 1996 range from 487 to 592 births. In
Table 1 continued
Sample period: 1992.11-1996.10 1994.11-1996.10 Dec 1992-1995 Dec 1994-1995 Dec 1996
Not employed before birth 0.245
(0.43)
0.239
(0.426)
0.245
(0.43)
0.242
(0.428)
0.240
(0.427)
Labor market status unknown 0.017***
(0.128)
0.024***
(0.154)
0.016***
(0.124)
0.023***
(0.15)
0.041
(0.198)
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance of the difference between the first (second, third, or fourth column, respectively) and the last column
at the 10, 5, and 1 % level, respectively
12 November 1996 births are excluded as well because, according to
the distribution of the pregnancy duration, about 5 % of responding
mothers who conceived immediately after announcement delivered
before November 28, 1996. This follows from the 90 % confidence
interval that ranges from 266 to 287 days of pregnancy. More
importantly, it turns out that the initial confusion about the exact date
of the abolition was less pronounced than our reading of the
newspapers suggested (see section ‘‘The abolition of the baby bonus’’
again) and that many prospective parents must have known the date of
the abolition already before the first week of March. Indeed, we
already find a substantial, and statistically significant number of
additional births in November 1996 (results not shown). This implies
that our main estimates based on births in December 1996 unambig-
uously represent a lower bound on the overall fertility effect.
13 Similarly, we also include additional dummies for the other major
policy changes that were implemented during the sample period (see
footnote 10 for details).
14 We also re-ran our baseline regressions using the total fertility rate
as dependent variable. Results turn out to be qualitatively similar.
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all three cases, the estimate of the extra births turns out to
be statistically significant. In relative terms, the estimates
imply that about 6.8 % (¼ 100%  ½487=ð7;613  487Þ) to
8.4 % (¼ 100%  ½592=ð7;613  592Þ) additional children
were born due to the announced abolition of the bonus. We
get very similar estimates when using the log number of
births as the dependent variable, as shown in the lower part
of panel A. Relative effects in this case range from about
6.8 % (¼ 100%  ½expð0:066Þ  1) to 8.1%
(¼ 100%  ½expð0:078Þ  1).
It turns out that our alternative strategy yields very similar
estimates, as shown in panel B. Depending on the sample
period, estimates range from a low of 664 (9.5 %) to a high of
698 (10.1 %) extra births in December 1996. Using data
from after the policy change as well thus yields somewhat
larger estimates than those we obtain when we only use data
from before the policy change, but the point estimates based
on the two strategies are in fact not statistically different from
each other. Again, using the log number of births yields very
similar quantitative implications.
Table 2 Fertility responsiveness
Panel A: Observations from before the abolition only, linear time trend
Sample period 1994.11-1996.10 1993.11-1996.10 1992.11-1996.10
Number of births
Residual December 1996 486.625***
(46.648)
562.583***
(109.883)
591.333***
(114.649)
Number of births December 1996 7613 7613 7613
Number of observations 24 36 48
Adjusted R2 0.739 0.718 0.838
p value(F statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log number of births
Residual December 1996 0.066***
(0.006)
0.075***
(0.014)
0.078***
(0.014)
Number of log births December 1996 8.938 8.937 8.938
Number of observations 24 36 48
Adjusted R2 0.732 0.715 0.839
p value (F statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel B: Observations from before and after the abolition, nonlinear time trend
Sample period 1990.7–1996.10 &
1997.1–2006.12
1990.7–1996.10 &
1998.1–2006.12
1990.7–1996.10 &
1999.1–2006.12
Number of births
Residual December 1996 698.290***
(129.264)
678.489***
(124.48)
663.846***
(123.07)
Number of births December 1996 7613 7613 7613
Number of observations 196 184 172
Adjusted R2 0.956 0.960 0.962
p value (F statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log number of births
Residual December 1996 0.097***
(0.018)
0.094***
(0.018)
0.091***
(0.017)
Number of log births December 1996 8.938 8.937 8.938
Number of observations 196 184 172
Adjusted R2 0.952 0.957 0.960
p value (F statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1 % level. In Panel A, the time trend is assumed to be linear and the underlying sample period varies
between two (column 2) and four (column 4) years prior to the effective policy change. In Panel B, the time trend is assumed to follow a fourth-
order polynomial in calendar time, and a dummy variable for each major policy change within this period is included (1997.1, 2000.7, 2002.1).
The underlying sample period basically covers observations from 1990.7 to 2006.12, but leaves out a period in between which is potentially
affected by the policy change. The period left-out varies between 2 months (i.e., November and December 1996) and 3 years and 2 months (i.e.,
the period from November 1996 to December 1998)
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Robustness
We first test the sensitivity of our baseline results with
respect to (additional) variations in the sample period.
Remember that when only using observations from before
the abolition of the bonus, our baseline model uses either
24, 36, or 48 months prior to the policy change in order to
predict the December 1996 birth count. Panel A of Table 3
shows the resulting minimum and maximum estimate of
the fertility response when we vary the length of the
observation period, in steps of 1 month, from 24 to
48 months. Estimates turn out to be robust to this variation
in the sample period. The resulting minimum (maximum)
estimate equals 417 (622) births, an estimate well within
the range of our baseline estimates. The same conclusion
applies to the range of estimates when using the log
number of births as the dependent variable.
When using observations from both before and after the
policy change, our baseline result basically relies on the
whole observation period from July 1990 to December
1996, but excludes a period in between of varying length.
In contrast to the baseline specification, panel B of Table 3
holds the omitted period fix (1997.1–1999.1), but varies the
length of the sample period before and after the omitted
period, from a minimum of 24 months to a maximum of
76 months. Again, estimates turn out to be surprisingly
robust across the various sample periods. The minimum
(maximum) estimate among all estimates is equal to 309
(684) additional births in December 1996. As above, we
find a quantitatively similar pattern of estimates when
modeling the log number of births instead of the absolute
number of births.
As an additional robustness check, we apply an alter-
native two-step procedure. In a first step, we de-trend the
whole time series using a conventional Hodrick–Prescott
filter. We then regress the de-trended number of births on a
series of monthly dummies in the second step.15 As in the
baseline model, we use the four foregoing years to predict
the de-trended number of births in December 1996.
Moreover, this exercise is not only done for the real policy
change but also for hypothetical policy changes in
December 1993, 1994 and 1995. Panel C of Table 3 pre-
sents the results. The first column shows that the impact of
the abolition is estimated to amount to 455 additional
births. This estimate is slightly smaller than the estimate
obtained by the baseline model, but it is well within the
estimated range of estimates from panel A above (i.e., the
estimates are not significantly different from each other).16
The results presented in the subsequent columns show
estimates of the residual number of births in the hypo-
thetical scenario that the policy change happened one, 2 or
3 years earlier than it actually did. It is immediately evi-
dent that none of the placebo regressions yields a residual
that is statistically different from zero, underlining our
argument that the announced abolition of the baby bonus
increased fertility in the short-run.
Alternative estimation approach
As a final robustness test we present results based on a
slightly different estimation approach than before. In con-
trast to our baseline estimates, the impact of the policy
change in this case is estimated by including a simple
binary indicator that takes on the value of one for the
observation from December 1996, and zero otherwise (see
footnote 10 again). That is, we estimate the parameters of
the following regression model:
bt ¼ a þ bjðtÞ þ b0xt þ cm þ d1ðt 1997:1Þ þ w1ðt
¼ 1996:12Þ þ et; ð4Þ
with t running from 1994.11 to 1999.12, from 1992.11 to
1999.12, or from 1990.7 to 2006.12.17 The alternative
approach thus uses data from both before and after the
abolition of the baby bonus without excluding any obser-
vations after the policy change, in contrast to our previous
estimates presented in Tables 2 and 3. One advantage of
this alternative approach is that we can additionally control
for observed maternal characteristics, and, thus, Table 4
shows results with and without controlling for average
maternal characteristics xt [i.e., age, schooling, child parity,
marital status (married), and employment status
(employed)]. In either case, the estimated fertility response
is simply given by bw, the estimated coefficient on the
dummy variable indicating that t equals 1996.12.
It is immediately evident that this alternative strategy
yields estimates that are similar (in fact, statistically iden-
tical) to our baseline estimates, with estimates ranging
from about 595 to 697 additional number of births (alter-
natively, in the case of using the log number of births as
dependent variable, with an additional 8.4–9.6 % of births
in December 1996).
15 Specifically, we run the following regression: €bt ¼ a þ cm þ et ,
where €bt denotes the de-trended number of monthly births and cm
denotes the inclusion of a full set of monthly dummies.
16 It is actually quite intuitive that the estimate based on the de-
trended number of births is smaller because the filter fits the time
trend using all observations—including the extra births in December
1996. As a consequence, the time trend is biased upward around the
date of the true policy change. This in turn results in a downward
biased estimate for the fertility response in December 1996.
17 The first (second) sample period covers the same observations as
our baseline estimates (cf. column 1(3) in panel A of Table 2), but
includes 1996.11 and 1996.12 and extends the sample period until
1999.12. The third sample period uses the maximum number of
observations (similar to panel B of Table 2).
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Conception (re-)scheduling versus timing of births
Thus far we have ignored the fact that we expect to see
extra births in December 1996 for two very distinct
reasons. First, as we have discussed above, there was a
short window of opportunity of about 3 weeks during
which prospective mothers could try to get pregnant in
order to give birth before January 1, 1997 and still get
the birth benefit. A second reason, however, may be that
women with a due date close to the date of abolition
could have manipulated the exact day of birth by means
of a surgical intervention (i.e., cesarean section). We now
try to gain some insight into the effective source of the
additional births that we observe in December 1996. To
distinguish between the two channels, we now focus on
the date of conception, which can easily be derived from
the available information on the duration of pregnancy
and the date of birth. Note that, because the abolition of
the birth benefit was announced after the first week of
March, the 3 week response window falls entirely into
the month of March. Hence, the comparison of the
impact on the number of conceptions in March with the
impact on the number of births in December 1996 is
insightful in terms of whether conception (re-)scheduling
or birth timing is the primary cause of the extra births in
December 1996. Analogous to the baseline model, we
use data from the preceding 48 months to make a simple
prediction of the number of babies that would have been
conceived in March 1996 in the absence of the policy
change.
The resulting estimates, shown in Table 5, imply that
631, or about 9.1 % (¼ 100%  631=ð7;547  631Þ),
Table 3 Robustness
Dependent variable Number of births Log (number of births)
Min Max Min Max
Panel A: Observations from before the abolition only, linear time trend
Residual December 1996 416.800***
(65.384)
622.250***
(114.179)
0.056***
(0.008)
0.082***
(0.015)
Number of (log) births December 1996 7613 7613 8.937 8.937
Number of observations 25 40 25 40
Adjusted R2 0.667 0.814 0.661 0.812
p value (F statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel B: Observations from both before and after the abolition, nonlinear time trend
Residual December 1996 308.955***
(102.14)
683.588***
(140.048)
0.041***
(0.015)
0.095***
(0.019)
Number of (log) births December 1996 7,613 7,613 8.937 8.937
Number of observations 61 81 61 65
Adjusted R2 0.941 0.909 0.937 0.863
p value (F statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
True policy change Placebo regressions
Y: 1996 Y: 1995 Y: 1994 Y: 1993
Panel C: Placebo regressions, de-trended number of births
Residual December Y 455.025***
(143.074)
-182.784
(150.167)
72.090
(135.771)
68.241
(145.206)
Number of births December Y 7,613 7,232 7,605 7,672
Number of observations 48 48 48 48
Adjusted R2 0.648 0.669 0.732 0.741
p value (F statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1 % level. Panel A uses a linear time trend with a sample period that varies between two and four years
prior to the policy change. The model in panel B assumes a time trend that follows the fourth polynomial. The sample period varies between 24
and 76 months before and after the policy change, while the omitted period in between is held fixed (1997.1–1999.1). Panel C shows results from
several placebo regressions based on the de-trended series of monthly births. See main text for details
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additional children were conceived in March 1996 on top
of what would have been expected in the absence of the
policy change. Remember that our baseline model yields
an estimate of 591 additional births in December 1996 (see
Table 2)—almost the same number as our estimate for the
additional number of conceptions in March 1996. The fact
that both results are very much in line with each other
suggests that conception (re-)scheduling, rather than birth
timing by medical intervention, is the underlying cause of
the observed fertility response. Section ‘‘Birth complica-
tions’’ below provides additional evidence in line with this
result, showing that there is no impact on the fraction of
cesarean sections conducted in December 1996. Finally,
note that it is likely that the number of couples trying to
move baby plans forward is likely to be higher than those
616 who finally succeeded.18
Taking risks for the bonus?
Birth complications
We now try to understand whether mothers (un)con-
sciously take health risks for themselves and/or their
newborn child when trying to obtain the bonus. We start
looking at birth complications. In the following we con-
sider instrumental vaginal delivery mechanisms (forceps
delivery, vacuum extraction, and breech delivery) as indi-
cation of birth complications, as all three delivery methods
involve potential health risks for mother and/or child and
are, thus, applied in emergency situations only. While the
former two types of assisted deliveries are used in the case
Table 4 Alternative estimation approach
Dependent variable: Number of births Log (number of births)
Sample period 1994.11–1999.12 1992.11–1999.12 1990.7–2006.12 1994.11–1999.12 1992.11–1999.12 1990.7–2006.12
Panel A: without controls for maternal characteristics
1(t = 1996.12) 616.558***
(196.818)
601.603***
(179.079)
672.943***
(150.400)
0.088***
(0.029)
0.084***
(0.026)
0.094***
(0.022)
Number of observations 62 86 198 62 86 198
Adjusted R2 0.854 0.915 0.954 0.845 0.908 0.951
p value (F statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel B: with controls for maternal characteristics
1(t = 1996.12) 594.613**
(225.229)
624.208***
(194.750)
697.095***
(154.823)
0.085**
(0.034)
0.086***
(0.028)
0.096***
(0.023)
Number of observations 62 86 198 62 86 198
Adjusted R2 0.840 0.909 0.953 0.830 0.903 0.949
p value (F statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 5 and 1 % level, respectively. The overall time trend is assumed to follow a first-order (fourth-
order) polynomial in the first and second (third) column. All specifications include a full set of monthly dummies. We also include a dummy
variable for each major policy change (i.e., 1997.1, 2000.7, 2002.1) if covered by the sample period. Panel B includes additional controls for
maternal characteristics [i.e., age, schooling, child parity, marital status (married) and employment status (employed)]
Table 5 Conception (re-)scheduling versus birth timing
Dependent variable Number of
conceptions
Log number of
conceptions
Residual March 1996 631.041***
(135.143)
0.083***
(0.017)
Number of (log)
conceptions March 1996
7,547 8.928
Number of observations 48 48
Adjusted R2 0.783 0.784
p value (F statistic) 0.000 0.000
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1 % level. The dependent
variable is the number of conceptions in March 1996. The regression
specification assumes a linear time trend. The sample period covers
all conceptions within the four years preceding March 1996
18 A rough approximation of the total number of responding couples
is obtained by multiplying the number of extra births with the
probability of becoming pregnant within 3 weeks. Gnoth et al. [13]
study the likelihood of spontaneous conception in subsequent cycles
for a random sample of German women and find that cumulative
probabilities of conception at one, three, six and twelve cycle(s) are,
respectively, 38, 68, 81 and 92 %. A linear interpolation between
month 0 and 1 one yields a cumulative probability of conception of
29 % at week three, which implies that approximately 2038 (=591/
0.29) couples were induced to bring their baby plans forward.
Relative to the December 1996 birth count that would have occurred
in the absence of the policy change, the responsive sample thus
amounts to as much as 29 % [=2038/(7613 - 591)].
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of maternal exhaustion, fetal distress, or a combination of
both, the latter method is used in labor with a baby in head-
down position. For simplicity, we will refer to these
instrumental vaginal delivery mechanisms as ‘‘birth com-
plications’’ in what follows. Cesarean section is considered
separately because it has been performed upon request
more recently for deliveries that could otherwise have been
natural, even though it is usually performed only when a
vaginal delivery would put baby’s or mother’s life or health
at risk. Accordingly, we think that a cesarean section must
be viewed as an instrument for deliberate birth timing—in
line with the results from Gans and Leigh [12] and Tamm
[26].
To estimate the impact of the abolition of the bonus on
the incident of birth complications, we use basically the
same regression specification as in section ‘‘Alternative
estimation approach’’, but with the percentage share of
birth complications as the dependent variable. We prefer
the alternative estimation approach in this context because
we focus on the composition of births now, rather than on
the number of births, and, thus, it is less important not to
include observations from those time periods potentially
affected by the abolition of the baby bonus. Because
information on birth procedure is only reported from 1995
onwards, the sample period covers the period from January
1995 to December 2006.19
Table 6 reports the baseline result for the percentage of
overall birth complications (column 1), as well as for single
birth procedures (columns 2–4). Finally, the last column
shows the estimated impact on the percentage of cesarean
sections. We find that there is a statistically significant and
substantial increase in the percentage of overall birth
complications of about 0.9 percentage points in the month
prior to abolition of the baby bonus. Note that this corre-
sponds to a relative increase in the probability of experi-
encing some birth complication by about 17 %
(¼ 100%  ð0:967=5:587Þ). In absolute numbers, the fig-
ures imply that about 74 additional complications were
observed in December 1996 (’ 0:009  ð7;613 þ 600Þ).
The following three columns show results by individual
delivery method. Estimates show a significant increase for
all but one of the instrumental vaginal birth procedures
(forceps delivery). The overall increase in the share of
labor complications is, thus, mainly driven by an increase
of breech deliveries and vacuum extractions. In terms of
non-vaginal instrumental delivery methods, column 5
reveals an insignificant estimate for the percentage share of
cesarean sections, suggesting that women did not use this
method to deliberately manipulate the date of birth.
One potential explanation of this finding is that
responsive mothers are simply a selected group of mothers.
If (some of) the characteristics of these mothers are asso-
ciated with preexisting conditions encouraging birth com-
plications, such as age at birth, differential fertility
responsiveness may mechanically affect the incidence of
birth complications.20 To get an idea of how important
compositional changes are in explaining the observed
increase in the likelihood of experiencing some birth
complication, we ran an additional decomposition exercise
based on individual-level data (see ‘‘Appendix’’ for
details). The decomposition results suggest that only a
small fraction, about 12–13.5 %, of the observed increase
in the likelihood of experiencing some birth complication
can be related to observable compositional changes
resulting from differential responsiveness. It is clear,
however, that we cannot rule out that additional, unob-
served maternal characteristics (such as mothers’ health
status) explain some of the increased risk of experiencing
some birth complication as well.
At the same time, the fact that observable maternal
characteristics explain only a minor part of the increased
risk of birth complications also opens up the possibility of
an alternative explanation. Specifically, we may plausibly
think of the babies moved forward as mistimed pregnan-
cies, in the sense that these pregnancies occurred earlier
than initially planned or desired, and there is evidence that
mistimed pregnancy is associated with increased behav-
ioral and psychological risks.21 First, the most important
behavioral risks associated with mistimed pregnancies are
smoking, drinking, and diet; and such behavior is known to
be associated with complications at birth [8, 9]. Other
studies have found that mistimed pregnancies are associ-
ated with psychological distress. For example, Orr [21] find
that women with a mistimed pregnancy are more likely to
show depressive symptoms than women with an intended
pregnancy. Similarly, Cheng et al. [8] find that women
with a mistimed pregnancy are more likely to suffer from
postpartum depression. Increased psychological distress
19 Running the same model, but excluding either one, 2 or 3 years in
between yields very similar estimates to those reported in Table 6.
20 For example, Rayl et al. [24] show that maternal characteristics
like primiparity and older maternal age are associated with an
increased risk of breech birth. The Austrian data show a very similar
picture: the major determinants for both instrumental non-vaginal and
instrumental vaginal delivery are primiparity and older age (results
not shown).
21 In the medical and epidemiological literature, a mistimed
pregnancy is usually defined as a pregnancy that occurred earlier
than desired (e.g., Cheng et al. [8]). Under normal circumstances,
antedating a child is a conscious action and should not be considered a
mistimed pregnancy. In our case, however, incentives to antedate a
child were increased exogenously while other relevant circumstances
(e.g., financial situation, health behavior, workload, size of the
apartment) remained unchanged. In such a situation, one may argue
that mothers are exposed to similar risks as in the case of a truly
mistimed pregnancy.
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during pregnancy in turn appears to be associated with an
increased risk of pregnancy complications [17, 19].
Newborns’ health
We next explore the direct impact on newborns’ health
using several distinct health measures: the incidence of a
preterm birth, low birth weight, length at birth and the
Apgar score, which is a measure for quickly assessing the
health of a newborn (cf. footnote 9). We expect to find
differences in the health of children born in December
1996 for the same reasons as for birth complications. If
newborns’ health is associated with characteristics of the
mother, differences in the health of newborn children may
simply result from heterogeneous fertility responses. While
compositional changes may have positive or negative
effects on newborns’ health, the additional behavioral and
psychological risks potentially triggered by a mistimed
pregnancy are expected to unambiguously harm the health
of the newborn.22
Table 7 shows the resulting estimates for four different,
more or less direct health measures. All estimates are
derived applying the same estimation strategy as in the case
of birth complications (see section ‘‘Birth complications’’
above). The sample period runs from 1992.11 to 2006.12.
The first column shows the effect on the percentage of
newborn children with a low Apgar score (i.e., a score lower
than 7). The resulting point estimate is small and statisti-
cally not different from zero. Similarly, we do not find any
negative effect on the likelihood of small birth length, of
low birth weight or of a premature birth.23 Overall, we thus
find no statistical evidence for any (immediate) negative
impact on the health of newborn children (if anything, there
is a weakly significant negative effect on the probability of
experiencing a premature birth; however, this effect is not
robust across specifications)—despite the fact that we find
evidence of increased labor complications, which would
suggest that the abolition of the baby bonus put some
children at risk. Of course, this finding does not rule out the
existence of any health effect in the medium or the long run.
Table 6 Birth complications
Any birth complication Vacuum extraction Forceps delivery Breech delivery Cesarean section
Mean 5.587 4.365 0.698 0.524 18.588
Standard deviation 0.419 0.559 0.383 0.351 4.555
Panel A: With controls for maternal characteristics
1(t = 1996.12) 0.967***
(0.365)
0.507*
(0.285)
0.142
(0.125)
0.318**
(0.140)
0.210
(0.655)
Number of observations 144 144 144 144 144
Adjusted R2 0.398 0.793 0.916 0.874 0.984
p value (F statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel B: Without controls for maternal characteristics
1(t = 1996.12) 0.909**
(0.355)
0.428
(0.281)
0.128
(0.123)
0.353**
(0.137)
0.370
(0.675)
Number of observations 144 144 144 144 144
Adjusted R2 0.407 0.791 0.915 0.873 0.982
p value (F statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % level, respectively. The dependent variable in column 1 is the overall
percentage share of birth complications (equal to the sum of columns 2–4), while columns 2–5 show the estimated impact on single delivery
methods. The sample period runs from 1995.1 to 2006.12. The time trend is assumed to follow a fourth-order polynomial in calendar time. All
specifications include a full set of monthly dummies as well as a dummy variable for each major policy change covered by the sample period
(i.e., 1997.1, 2000.7, 2002.1). Panel A includes additional control for maternal characteristics [i.e., age, schooling, child parity, marital status
(married) and employment status (employed)]
22 For example, Pulley et al. [23] find that the mistiming of a
pregnancy positively correlates with the probability of a preterm
delivery (and low birth weight). They conclude that pregnancies that
are mistimed by more than a few months may have severe health
consequences for both mother and child. Similar results for
unintended (i.e., both mistimed and unwanted) births are reported
by Orr et al. [22].
23 Note that it may make sense to look at the share of premature
births conceived in March rather than born in December 1996. This is
because babies conceived within the relevant time window of 3 weeks
following the announcement, when born prematurely, would have
been born at most 8.5 months later and, thus, probably already in
November. However, this yields an insignificant estimate as well.
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Conclusions
We studied the fertility and health effects preceding the
abolition of the Austrian baby bonus on January 1, 1997.
Even though the bonus was rather small relative to other
family benefits available, it was still worth about 4.5 % of
the median annual labor income in the year of its abolition.
Moreover, because the abolition was made public about
10 months in advance, prospective parents not only had a
financial incentive but also the possibility to react without
the need of medical intervention.
We find that about 8 % (roughly 600) more babies
were born than in the absence of (the public announce-
ment of) the policy change in December 1996, the month
before the abolition of the baby bonus. This effect proves
to be robust to a variety of robustness checks and
alternative estimation strategies. Also, considering the
fact that the window of opportunity was quite a short
period of about 3 weeks only, the fertility response
appears to be quite large. We also find (re-)scheduling of
conceptions rather than direct birth timing (through
medical intervention) to be the source of the fertility
response. Our analysis of birth procedures further reveals
a significant and substantial increase in the fraction of
mothers experiencing some kind of birth complications
by about one percentage point (a relative increase in the
likelihood of about 17 %). We calculate that only a small
fraction of this increase in birth complications can be
attributed to changes in observable maternal characteris-
tics. It thus appears plausible that some part of the
unexplained increase in birth complications is caused by
an underlying increase in behavioral and/or psychological
risks triggered by the mistiming of pregnancies (while
the other part is best viewed as being caused by unob-
served maternal characteristics), even though we are not
able to exactly pin down the importance of unobserved
compositional changes due to selection versus the mist-
iming of pregnancy due to data limitations (most
importantly perhaps, our data contain no information on
the health status and health behavior of mothers). The
increase in birth complications notwithstanding, we do
not find any adverse immediate impact on newborns’
health.
On a more general level, our results illustrate that
announcement effects may be an important issue in health
policy reforms, and the abolition of the Austrian birth
benefit clearly shows that even relatively small changes in
financial incentives may trigger substantial behavioral
responses. Policy makers should thus be aware that not
only a policy (reform) itself, but also the public
announcement of its abolition (or introduction) may have
an impact on individual behavior. Second, our results also
suggest that policy announcements may lead some indi-
viduals to make bad choices in the sense that they uncon-
sciously take health risks in return for a short-run financial
benefit. Even though we cannot pin down the importance of
Table 7 Newborn’s health
Poor health (Apgar\7) Small birth length (\45 cm) Low birth weight (\2,500 g) Premature birth (\37 weeks)
Mean 1.369 2.876 6.330 5.883
Standard deviation 0.180 0.390 0.668 0.821
Panel A: With controls for maternal characteristics
1(t = 1996.12) -0.106
(0.161)
-0.265
(0.265)
-0.641
(0.403)
-0.638*
(0.345)
Number of
observations
170 170 170 170
Adjusted R2 0.344 0.621 0.700 0.854
p value (F statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel B: Without controls for maternal characteristics
1(t = 1996.12) -0.126
(0.154)
-0.294
(0.256)
-0.478
(0.393)
-0.539
(0.335)
Number of
observations
170 170 170 170
Adjusted R2 0.360 0.624 0.697 0.854
p value (F statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
* denotes statistical significance at the 10 % level. The dependent variable is the percentage share of newborn children that are in poor health
(indicated by a low Apgar score), of small birth length, of low birth weight or born prematurely. The sample period runs from 1992.11 to
2006.12. The time trend is assumed to follow a fourth-order polynomial in calendar time. All specifications include a full set of monthly dummies
as well as a dummy variable for each major policy change covered by the sample period (i.e. 1997.1, 2000.7, 2002.1). Panel A includes
additional control for maternal characteristics [i.e., age, schooling, child parity, marital status (married) and employment status (employed)]
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this mechanism exactly, it seems fair to say that dealing
with announcement effects appears to be especially
important in the context of health policy, both in the
planning and implementation as well as in the ex-post
evaluation of specific policy measures.
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Appendix: Decomposing the increase in birth
complications
To explore whether the increase in birth complications is
due to unobserved stress or due to selection, we perform a
simple regression-based decomposition analysis based on
individual-level data [4, 20]. The goal of this exercise is to
determine the impact of selective fertility responses on the
likelihood of some birth complication. For the decompo-
sition analysis we simply compare mothers who gave birth
in December 1996 with mothers who gave birth in
December 1995. Table 8 shows the results (note that the
two columns differ only in the weighting scheme used for
the decomposition).
In line with the corresponding results from Table 8, the
upper part of Table 8 documents a difference in the like-
lihood of experiencing some birth complication of about
one percentage point (in Table 8, however, the difference
is not statistically significant). The lower part of the table
shows the decomposition results, revealing that about
12–14 % of the observed difference in the probability of
some birth complication is explained by differences in
observed maternal characteristics between the two groups
of mothers. Consequently, 86–88 % of the difference
remains unexplained.
The extent to which the unexplained part of the increase
in birth complications is driven by an underlying increase
in behavioral and/or psychological risks from the misti-
ming of births depends on whether the included variables
describe maternal characteristics comprehensively. If the
omitted variables are correlated with responsiveness to the
incentive and, therefore, with group affiliation, then the
unexplained part of the decomposition might capture not
only increased behavioral/psychological risks, but also
other unobserved group differences.24
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